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Abstract: Formal methods have been very successful in analyzing security protocols for reach-
ability properties such as secrecy or authentication. In contrast, there are very few results for
equivalence-based properties, crucial for studying e.g. privacy-like properties such as anonymity
or vote secrecy.
We study the problem of checking equivalence of security protocols for an unbounded number of
sessions. Since replication leads very quickly to undecidability (even in the simple case of secrecy),
we focus on a limited fragment of protocols (standard primitives but pairs, one variable per proto-
col’s rules) for which the secrecy preservation problem is known to be decidable. Surprisingly, this
fragment turns out to be undecidable for equivalence. Then, restricting our attention to determin-
istic protocols, we propose the first decidability result for checking equivalence of protocols for an
unbounded number of sessions. This result is obtained through a characterization of equivalence
of protocols in terms of equality of languages of (generalized, real-time) deterministic pushdown
automata.
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Des protocoles de sécurité aux automates à pile
Résumé : Les méthodes formelles ont rencontré beaucoup de succès dans
l’analyse de protocoles de sécurité pour des propriétés d’accessibilité telles que
le secret ou l’authentification. À l’inverse, il existe très peu de résultats pour
des propriétés basées sur l’équivalence, cruciales pour étudier par exemple des
propriétés comme l’anonymat ou le secret du vote.
Nous étudions le problème de la vérification de l’équivalence de protocoles
sécurisés pour un nombre non borné de sessions. Dans la mesure où la répli-
cation conduit très vite à l’indécidabilté (même dans le cas simple du secret),
nous nous restreignons à un fragment limité de protocoles (primitives standards
sans paires, une variable par règle du protocole) pour lequel le problème du se-
cret est décidable. De façon surprenante, l’équivalence dans ce fragment s’avère
être indécidable. Par la suite, en nous concentrant sur les protocoles détermin-
istes, nous proposons le premier résultat de décidabilité pour la vérification de
l’équivalence de protocoles pour un nombre non borné de sessions. Ce résul-
tat est obtenu via une caractérisation de l’équivalence de protocoles en termes
d’égalité de langages d’automates à pile (généralisés, temps-réel).
Mots-clés : méthodes formelles, protocoles cryptographiques, automates à
pile, équivalence
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1 Introduction
Formal methods have been successfully applied for rigorously analyzing secu-
rity protocols. In particular, many algorithms and tools (see [?, ?, ?, ?, ?] to
cite a few) have been designed to automatically find flaws in protocols or prove
security. Most of these results focus on reachability properties such as authen-
tication or secrecy: for any execution of the protocol, it should never be the
case that an attacker learns some secret (secrecy property) or that an attacker
makes Alice think she’s talking to Bob while Bob did not engage a conversa-
tion with her (authentication property). However, privacy properties such as
vote secrecy, anonymity, or untraceability cannot be expressed as reachability
properties. They are instead defined as indistinguishability properties in [?, ?]).
For example, Alice’s identity remains private if an attacker cannot distinguish
a session where Alice is talking from a session where Bob is talking.
Studying indistinguishability properties for security protocols amounts into
checking a behavioral equivalence between processes. Processes represent pro-
tocols and are specified in some process algebras such as CSP or the pi-calculus,
except that messages are no longer atomic actions but terms, in order to faith-
fully represent cryptographic messages. Of course, considering terms instead of
atomic actions considerably increases the difficulty of checking equivalence. As
a matter of fact, there are just a few results for checking equivalence of processes
that manipulate terms.
• Based on a procedure developed by M. Baudet [?], it has been shown
that trace equivalence is decidable for deterministic processes with no
else branches, and for a family of equational theories that captures most
standard primitives [?]. A simplified proof of [?] has been proposed by
Y. Chevalier and M. Rusinowitch [?].
• A. Tiu and J. Dawson[?] have designed and implemented a procedure
for open bisimulation, a notion of equivalence stronger than the standard
notion of trace equivalence. This procedure only works for a limited class
of processes.
• V. Cheval et al. [?] have proposed and implemented a procedure for trace
equivalence, and for a quite general class of processes. They consider non
deterministic processes that use standard primitives, and that may involve
else branches.
However, these decidability results analyse equivalence for a bounded number of
sessions only, that is assuming that protocols are executed a limited number of
times. This is of course a strong limitation. Even if no flaw is found when a
protocol is executed n times, there is absolutely no guarantee that the protocol
remains secure when it is executed n+ 1 times. And actually, the existing tools
for a bounded number of sessions can only analyse protocols for a very limited
number of sessions, typically 2 or 3. Another approach consists in implementing
a procedure that is not guaranteed to terminate. This is in particular the case of
ProVerif [?], a well-established tool for checking security of protocols. ProVerif
is able to check equivalence although it does not always succeed [?]. Of course,
Proverif does not correspond to any decidability result.
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Our contribution. We study the decidability of equivalence of security pro-
tocols for an unbounded number of sessions. Even in the case of reachability
properties such as secrecy, the problem is undecidable in general. We there-
fore focus on a class of protocols for which secrecy is decidable [?]. This class
typically assumes that each protocol rule manipulates at most one variable.
Surprisingly, even a fragment of this class (with only symmetric encryption)
turns out to be undecidable for equivalence properties. We consequently fur-
ther assume our protocols to be deterministic (that is, given an input, there
is at most one possible output). We show that equivalence is decidable for an
unbounded number of sessions and for protocols with randomized symmetric en-
cryption (no pair, no signature, etc.). Interestingly, we show that checking for
equivalence of protocols actually amounts into checking equality of languages of
deterministic pushdown automata. The decidability of equality of languages of
deterministic pushdown automata is a difficult problem, shown to be decidable
at Icalp in 1997 [?]. We actually characterize equivalence of protocols in terms
of equivalence of deterministic generalized real-time pushdown automata, that
is deterministic pushdown automata with no epsilon-transition but such that
the automata may unstack several symbols at a time. More precisely, we show
how to associate to a process P an automata AP such that two processes are
equivalent if, and only if, their corresponding automata yield the same language
and, reciprocally, we show how to associate to an automata A a process PA such
that two automata yield the same language if, and only if, their corresponding
processes are equivalent, that is:
P ≈ Q⇔ L(AP ) = L(AQ), and L(A) = L(B)⇔ PA ≈ PB.
Therefore, checking for equivalence of protocols is as difficult as checking
equivalence of deterministic generalized real-time pushdown automata.
2 Model for security protocols
Security protocols are modeled through a process algebra that manipulates
terms.
2.1 Syntax
Term algebra. As usual, messages are represented by terms. More specif-
ically, we consider a sorted signature with six sorts rand, key, msg, SimKey,
PrivKey and PubKey that represent respectively random numbers, keys, mes-
sages, symmetric keys, private keys and public keys. We assume that msg
subsumes the five other sorts, key subsumes SimKey, PrivKey and PubKey. We
consider six function symbols senc and sdec, aenc and adec, sign and check that
represent symmetric, asymmetric encryption and decryption as well as signa-
tures. Since we are interested in the analysis of indistinguishability properties,
we consider a randomized encryption scheme:
senc : msg × SimKey × rand → msg sdec : msg × SimKey → msg
aenc : msg × PubKey × rand → msg adec : msg × PrivKey → msg
sign : msg × PrivKey × rand → msg check : msg × PubKey → msg
We further assume an infinite set Σ0 of constant symbols of sort key or
msg, an infinite set Ch of constant symbols of sort channel, two infinite sets
Inria
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of variables X ,W, and an infinite set of names N = Npub unionmulti Nprv of names of
sort rand: Npub represents the random numbers drawn by the attacker whileNprv
represents the random numbers drawn by the protocol’s participants. As usual,
terms are defined as names, variables, and function symbols applied to other
terms. We denote by T (F ,N ,X ) the set of terms built on function symbols in
F , names in N , and variables in X . We simply write T (F ,N ) when X = ∅.
We consider three particular signatures:
Σpub = {senc, sdec, aenc, adec, sign, check, start}
Σ+ = Σpub ∪ Σ0 Σ = {senc, aenc, sign, start} ∪ Σ0
where start /∈ Σ0 is a constant symbol of sort msg. Σpub represents the func-
tions/data available to the attacker, Σ+ is the most general signature, while
Σ models actual messages (with no failed computation). We add a bijection
between elements of sort PrivKey and PubKey. If k is a constant of sort PrivKey,
k−1 will denotes its image by this function, called inverse. We will write the
inverse function the same, so that (k−1)−1 = k. To keep homogeneous nota-
tions, we will extend this function to symmetric keys: if k is of sort SimKey,
then k−1 = k. The relation between encryption and decryption is represented
through the following rewriting rules, yielding a convergent rewrite system:
sdec(senc(x, y, z), y)→ x adec(aenc(x, y, z), y−1)→ x
check(sign(x, y, z), y−1)→ x
This rule models the fact that the decryption of a ciphertext will return
the associated plaintext when the right key is used to perform decryption. We
denote by t↓ the normal form of a term t ∈ T (Σ+,N ,X ).
Example 1. The term m = senc(s, k, r) represents an encryption of the con-
stant s with the key k using the random r ∈ N , whereas t = sdec(m, k) models
the application of the decryption algorithm on m using k. We have that t↓ = s.
An attacker may build his own messages by applying functions to terms he
already knows. Formally, a computation done by the attacker is modeled by a
recipe. i.e. a term in T (Σpub,Npub,W). The variables in W intuitively refer to
variables used to store messages learnt by the attacker.
Process algebra. The intended behavior of a protocol can be modelled by a
process defined by the following grammar where u ∈ T (Σ,N ,X ), n ∈ N , and
c ∈ Ch:
P,Q := 0 | in(c, u).P | out(c, u).P | (P | Q) | !P | new n.P
The process “ in(c, u).P ” expects a message m of the form u on channel c and
then behaves like Pθ where θ is a substitution such that m = uθ. The process
“out(c, u).P ” emits u on channel c, and then behaves like P . The variables that
occur in u will be instantiated when the evaluation will take place. The process
P | Q runs P and Q in parallel. The process !P executes P some arbitrary
number of times. The process new n.P invents a new name n and continues
as P .
Sometimes, we will omit the null process. We write fv(P ) for the set of free
variables that occur in P , i.e. the set of variables that are not in the scope of
an input. A protocol is a ground process, i.e. a process P such that fv(P ) = ∅.
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Example 2. For the sake of illustration, we consider a naive protocol, where A
sends a value v (e.g. a vote) to B, encrypted by a short-term key exchanged
through a server.
1. A→ S : senc(kAB , kAS , rA)
2. S → B : senc(kAB , kBS , rS)
3. A→ B : senc(v, kAB , r)
The agent A sends a symmetric key kAB encrypted with the key kAS (using a
fresh random number rA). The server answers to this request by decrypting this
message and encrypting it with kBS. The agent A can now send his vote v
encrypted with kAB.
The role of A is modeled by a process PA(v) while the role of S is modeled
by PS. The role of B (which does not output anything) is omitted for concision.
PA(v)
def
= ! in(cA, start).new rA.out(cA, senc(kAB , kAS , rA)) (1)
| ! in(c′A, start).new r.out(cA, senc(v, kAB , r)) (2)
PS
def
= ! in(cS , senc(x, kAS , z)).new rS .out(cS , senc(x, kBS , rS)) (3)
| ! in(c′S , senc(x, kAS , z)).new rS .out(c′S , senc(x, kCS , rS)) (4)
where cA, c′A, cS , c
′
S are constants of sort channel, kAB, kAS, kBS, and kCS are
(private) constants in Σ0 of sort key, whereas rA, rS , r are names of sort rand,
and x (resp. z) is a variable of sort msg (resp. rand).
Intuitively, PA(v) sends kAB encrypted by kAS to the server (branch 1), and
then her vote encrypted by kAB (branch 2). The process PS models the server,
answering both requests from A to B (branch 3), as well as requests from A to C
(branch 4). More generally the server answers requests from any agent to any
agent but only two cases are considered here, again for concision. The whole
protocol is given by P (v), where PA(v) and PS evolve in parallel and additionally,
the secret key kCS is sent in clear, to model the fact that the attacker may learn
keys of some corrupted agents:
P (v)
def
= PA(v) | PS | ! in(c, start).out(c, kCS)
2.2 Semantics
A configuration of a protocol is a pair (P;σ) where:
• P is a multiset of processes. We often write P ∪ P, or P | P, instead of
{P} ∪ P.
• σ = {w1.m1, . . . ,wn.mn} is a frame, i.e. a substitution where w1, . . . ,wn
are variables in W, and m1, . . . ,mn are terms in T (Σ,N ). Those terms
represent the messages that are known by the attacker.
The operational semantics of protocol is defined by the relation α−→ over config-
urations. For sake of simplicity, we often write P instead of (P ; ∅).
Inria
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(in(c, u).P ∪ P;σ) in(c,R)−−−−→ (Pθ ∪ P;σ)
where R is a recipe such that Rσ↓ ∈ T (Σ,N ) and Rσ↓ = uθ for some θ
(out(c, u).P ∪ P;σ) out(c,wi+1)−−−−−−−→ (P ∪ P;σ ∪ {wi+1 . u})
where i is the number of elements in σ
(!P ∪ P;σ) τ−→ (P ∪ !P ∪ P;σ)
(new n.P ∪ P;σ) τ−→ (P{n′/n} ∪ P;σ) where n′ is a fresh name in Nprv
A process may input any term that an attacker can build (rule In). The
process out(c, u).P outputs u (which is stored in the attacker’s knowledge) and
then behaves like P . The two remaining rules are unobservable (τ action) from
the point of view of the attacker. The relation w−→ between configurations (where
w is a sequence of actions) is defined in a usual way. Given a sequence of observ-
able actions w, we write K w==⇒ K ′ when there exists w′ such that K w
′
−→ K ′ and
w is obtained from w′ by erasing all occurrences of τ . For every configuration
K, we define its set of traces as follows:
trace(K) = {(tr, σ) | K tr==⇒ (P;σ) for some configuration (P;σ)}.
Example 3. Going back to the protocol introduced in Example 2, consider the
following scenario: (i) the corrupted agent C discloses his secret key kCS; (ii)
the agent A initiates a session with B, and for this she sends a request to the
server S; (iii) the attacker intercepts this message and sends it to S as a request
coming from A to establish a key with C. Instead of answering to this request
with senc(kAB , kBS , rS), the server sends senc(kAB , kCS , rS), and the attacker
will learn kAB. More formally, we have that:
K0
def
= (P (v); ∅) in(c,start).out(c,w1).in(cA,start).out(cA,w2).in(c
′
S ,w2).out(c
′
S ,w3).========================================⇒ (P (v);σ)
where σ = {w1 . kCS , w2 . senc(kAB , kAS , rA), w3 . senc(kAB , kCS , rS)}, and
rA, rS are (fresh) names in Nprv. In this execution trace, first the key kCS is
sent after having called the corresponding process. Then, branches (1) and (4)
of P (v) are triggered.
2.3 Trace equivalence
Intuitively, two processes are equivalent if they cannot be distinguished by any
attacker. Trace equivalence can be used to formalise many interesting security
properties, in particular privacy-type properties, such as those studied for in-
stance in [?, ?]. We first introduce a notion of intruder’s knowledge well-suited
to cryptographic primitives for which the success of decrypting or checking a
signature is visible.
Definition 1. Two frames σ1 and σ2 are statically equivalent, σ1 ∼ σ2, when
we have that dom(σ1) = dom(σ2), and:
• for any recipe R, Rσ1↓ ∈ T (Σ,N ) if, and only if, Rσ2↓ ∈ T (Σ,N ); and
• for all recipes R1 and R2 such that R1σ1↓, R2σ1↓ ∈ T (Σ,N ), we have that
R1σ1↓ = R2σ1↓ if, and only if, R1σ2↓ = R2σ2↓.
RR n° 8290
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Intuitively, two frames are equivalent if an attacker cannot see the difference
between the two situations they represent: if some computation fails in σ1 it
should fail in σ2 as well, and σ1 and σ2 should satisfy the same equalities.
Example 4. Assume some agent publishes her vote encrypted. The possible
values for the votes are typically public. Therefore the question is not whether
an attacker may know the value of the vote (that he knows anyway) but instead,
whether he may distinguish between two executions where A votes differently.
Consider the two frames:
σi
def
= {w4 . v0, w5 . v1, w6 . senc(vi, kAB , r)} with i ∈ {0, 1}
where v0, v1 ∈ Σ0, and r ∈ Nprv. We have that σ0 ∼ σ1. Intuitively, there is no
test that allows the attacker to distinguish the two frames since the key kAB is
not available. In this scenario, the vote vi remains private. Now, consider the
frames σ′i = σ ∪ σi with i ∈ {0, 1} and σ as defined in Example 3. We have that
σ′0 6∼ σ′1. Indeed, consider the recipes R1 = sdec(w6, sdec(w3,w1)) and R2 = w4.
We have that R1σ′0↓ = R2σ′0↓ = v0, whereas R1σ′1↓ = v1 and R2σ′1↓ = v0.
Intuitively, an attacker can learn kAB and then compare the encrypted vote to
the values v0 and v1.
Intuitively, two processes are trace equivalent if, however they behave, the
resulting sequences of messages observed by the attacker are in static equiva-
lence.
Definition 2. Let P and Q be two protocols. We have that P v Q if for every
(tr, σ) ∈ trace(P ), there exists (tr′, σ′) ∈ trace(Q) such that tr = tr′ and σ ∼ σ′.
They are trace equivalent, written P ≈ Q, if P v Q and Q v P .
Example 5. Continuing Example 2, our naive protocol is secure if the vote of
A remains private. This is typically expressed by P (v0) | Q ≈ P (v1) | Q. An
attacker should not distinguish between two instances of the protocol where A
votes two different values. The purpose of Q is to disclose the two values v0 and
v1.
Q
def
=! in(c0, start).out(c0, v0) | ! in(c1, start).out(c1, v1)
However, our protocol is insecure. As seen in Example 3, an attacker may
learn kAB, and therefore distinguish between the two processes described above.
Formally, we have that P (v0) | Q 6≈ P (v1) | Q. This is reflected by the trace tr′
described below:
tr′ def= tr.in(c0, start).out(c0,w4).in(c1, start).out(c1,w5).in(c′A, start).out(c
′
A,w6).
We have that (tr′, σ′0) ∈ trace(K0) with K0 = (P (v0) | Q; ∅) and σ′0 as defined
in Example 4. Because of the existence of only one branch using each channel,
there is only one possible execution of P (v1) | Q (up to a bijective renaming of
the private names of sort rand) matching the labels in tr′, and the corresponding
execution will allow us to reach the frame σ′1 as described in Example 4. We
have already seen that static equivalence does not hold, i.e. σ′0 6∼ σ′1.
3 Ping-pong protocols
We aim at providing a decidability result for the problem of trace equivalence
between protocols in presence of replication. However, it is well-known that
Inria
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replication leads to undecidability even for the simple case of reachability prop-
erties. Thus, we consider a class of protocols, called Cpp, for which (in a slightly
different setting), reachability has already been proved decidable [?].
3.1 Class Cpp
We basically consider ping-pong protocols (an output is computed using only
the message previously received in input), and we assume a kind of determinism.
Moreover, we restrict the terms that are manipulated throughout the protocols:
only one unknown message (modelled by the use of a variable of sort msg) can
be received at each step.
We fix a variable x ∈ X of sort msg. An input term (resp. output term) is
a term defined by the grammars given below:
u := x | s | f(u, k, z) v := x | s | f(v, k, r)
where s, k ∈ Σ0 ∪ {start}, z ∈ X , f ∈ {senc, aenc, sign} and r ∈ N . Moreover, we
assume that each variable (resp. name) occurs at most once in u (resp. v).
Definition 3. Cpp is the class of protocol of the form:
P =
n
|
i=1
pi
|
j=1
!in(ci, u
i
j).new r1. . . . .new rkij . out(ci, v
i
j) such that:
1. for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and j ∈ {1, . . . , pi}, kij ∈ N, uij is an input term,
and vij is an output term where names occurring in vij are included in
{r1, . . . , rkij};
2. for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and j1, j2 ∈ {1, . . . , pi}, if j1 6= j2 then for any
renaming of variables, uij1 and u
i
j2
are not unifiable1.
Note that the purpose of item 2 is to restrict the class of protocols to those
that have a deterministic behavior (a particular input action can only be ac-
cepted by one branch of the protocol). This is a natural restriction since most
of the protocols are indeed deterministic: an agent should usually know exactly
what to do once he has received a message. Actually, the main limitations of
the class Cpp are stated in item 1 : we consider a restricted signature (e.g. no
pair, no hash function), and names can only be used to produce randomized
ciphertexts.
Example 6. The protocols described in Example 5 are in Cpp. For instance,
we can check that senc(x, kAS , z) is an input term whereas senc(x, kBS , rS) is an
output term. Moreover, the determinism condition (item 2) is clearly satisfied:
each branch of the protocol P (v0) | Q (resp. P (v0) | Q) uses a different
channel.
Our main contribution is a decision procedure for trace equivalence of pro-
cesses in Cpp. Details of the procedure are provided in Section 4.
Theorem 1. Let P and Q be two protocols in Cpp. The problem whether P
and Q are trace equivalent, i.e. P ≈ Q, is decidable.
1i.e. there does not exist θ such that uij1θ = u
i
j2
θ.
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3.2 Undecidability results
The class Cpp is somewhat limited but surprisingly, extending Cpp to non deter-
ministic processes immediately yields undecidability of trace equivalence. More
precisely, trace inclusion of processes in Cpp is already undecidable.
Theorem 2. Let P and Q be two protocols in Cpp. The problem whether P is
trace included in Q, i.e. P v Q, is undecidable.
This result is shown by encoding the Post Correspondence Problem (PCP).
Alternatively, it results from the reduction result established in Section 5 and
the undecidability result established in [?]. Undecidability of trace inclusion
actually implies undecidability of trace equivalence as soon as processes are
non deterministic. Indeed consider the choice operator + whose (standard)
semantics is given by the following rules:
({P +Q} ∪ P;σ) τ−→ (P ∪ P;σ) ({P +Q} ∪ P;σ) τ−→ (Q ∪ P;σ)
Corollary 1. Let P , Q1, and Q2 be three protocols in Cpp. The problem
whether P is equivalent to Q1 +Q2, i.e. P ≈ Q1 +Q2, is undecidable.
Indeed, consider P and Q1, for which trace inclusion encodes PCP, and let
Q2 = P . Trivially, P v Q1+Q2. Thus P ≈ Q1+Q2 if, and only if, Q1+Q2 v P ,
i.e. if, and only if, Q1 v P , hence the undecidability result.
4 From trace equivalence to language equivalence
This section is devoted to a sketch of proof of Theorem 1. Deciding trace
equivalence is done in two main steps. First, we show how to reduce the trace
equivalence problem between protocols in Cpp, to the problem of deciding trace
equivalence (still between protocols in Cpp) when the attacker acts as a for-
warder. Then, we encode the problem of deciding trace equivalence for forward-
ing attackers into the problem of language equivalence for real-time generalized
pushdown deterministic automata (GPDA).
4.1 Generalized pushdown automata
GPDA differ from deterministic pushdown automata (DPA) as they can un-
stack several symbols at a time. We consider real-time GPDA with final-state
acceptance.
Definition 4. A real-time GPDA is a 7-tuple A = (Q,Π,Γ, q0, ω,Qf , δ) where
Q is the finite set of states, q0 ∈ Q is the initial state, Qf ⊆ Q is the set of
accepting states, Π is the finite input-alphabet, Γ is the finite stack-alphabet, ω
is the initial stack symbol, and δ : (Q×Π×Γ0)→ Q×Γ0 is the partial transition
function such that:
• Γ0 is a finite subset of Γ∗; and
• for any (q, a, x) ∈ dom(δ) and y suffix strict of x, we have that (q, a, y) 6∈
dom(δ).
Inria
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Let q, q′ ∈ Q, w,w′, γ ∈ Γ∗, m ∈ Π∗, a ∈ Π; we note (qwγ, am) A (q′ww′,m)
if (q′, w′) = δ(q, a, γ). The relation  ∗A is the reflexive and transitive closure
of A. For every qw, q′w′ in QΓ∗ andm ∈ Π∗, we note qw m−→A q′w′ if, and only
if, (qw,m) ∗A (q′w′, ). For sake of clarity, a transition from q to q′ reading a,
popping γ from the stack and pushing w′ will be denoted by q
a;γ/w′−−−−→ q′.
Let A be a GPDA. The language recognized by A is defined by:
L(A) = {m ∈ Π∗ | q0ω m−→A qfw for some qf ∈ Qf and w ∈ Γ∗}.
A real-time GPDA can easily be converted into a DPA by adding new states
and -transitions. Thus, the problem of language equivalence for two real-time
GPDA A1 and A2, i.e. deciding whether L(A1) = L(A2) is decidable [?].
4.2 Getting rid of the attacker
We define the actions of a forwarder by modifying our semantics. We restrict
the recipes R,R1, and R2 that are used in the In rule and in static equivalence
(Definition 1) to be either the public constant start or a variable in W. This
leads us to consider a new relation =⇒fwd between configurations, and a new
notion of static equivalence ∼fwd. We denote by ≈fwd the trace equivalence
relation induced by this new semantics.
Example 7. The trace exhibited in Example 3 is still a valid one according to
the forwarder semantics, and the frames σ′0 and σ′1 described in Example 4 are in
equivalence according to ∼fwd. Actually, we have that P (v0) | Q ≈fwd P (v1) | Q.
Indeed, the fact that a forwarder simply acts as a relay prevents him to mount
the aforementioned attack.
As shown above, the forwarder semantics is very restrictive: a forwarder can
not rely on his deduction capabilities to mount an attack. To counterbalance
the effects of this semantics, the key idea consists in modifying the protocols
under study by adding new rules that encrypt and decrypt messages on demand
for the forwarder.
Formally, we define a transformation Tfwd that associates to a pair of pro-
tocols in Cpp a finite set of pairs of protocols (still in Cpp), and we show the
following result:
Proposition 1. Let P and Q be two protocols in Cpp. We have that:
P ≈ Q if, and only if, P ′ ≈fwd Q′ for some (P ′, Q′) ∈ Tfwd(P,Q).
Roughly the transformation Tfwd consists in first guessing among the keys of
the protocols P and the keys of the protocols Q those that are deducible by the
attacker, as well as a bijection α between these two sets. We can show that such
a bijection necessarily exists when P ≈ Q. Then, to compensate the fact that
the attacker is a simple forwarder, we give him access to encryption/decryption
oracles for any deducible key k, adding the corresponding branches in the pro-
cesses, i.e.:
! in(csenck , x).new r.out(c
senc
k , senc(x, k, r)) | ! in(csdeck , senc(x, k, z)).out(csdeck , x)
To maintain the equivalence, we do a similar transformation in both P and Q
relying on the bijection α. We ensure that the set of deducible keys has been
correctly guessed by adding of some extra processes. Then the main step of
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the proof consists in showing that the forwarder has now the same power as
a full attacker, although he cannot reuse the same randomness in two distinct
encryptions, as a real attacker could.
4.3 Encoding a protocol into a real-time GPDA
For any process P ∈ Cpp, we can show that it is possible to define a polynomial-
sized a real-time GPDA AP such that trace equivalence against forwarder of
two processes coincides with language equivalence of the two corresponding
automata.
Theorem 3. Let P and Q in Cpp, we have that: P ≈fwd Q ⇐⇒ L(AP ) =
L(AQ).
The idea is that the automaton AP associated to a protocol P recognizes
the words (a sequence of channels) that correspond to a possible execution in P .
The stack of AP is used to store a (partial) representation of the last outputted
term. This requires to convert a term into a word, and we use the following
representation:
s = s for any constant s ∈ Σ0 ∪ {start}; and f(v, k, r) = v¯.k otherwise.
Note that, even if our signature is infinite, we show that only a finite number
of constants of sort msg and a finite number of constants of sort channel need
to be considered (namely those that occur in the protocols under study). Thus,
the stack-alphabet and the input-alphabet of the automaton are both finite.
To construct the automaton associated to a process P ∈ Cpp, we need to con-
struct an automaton that recognizes any execution of P and the corresponding
valid tests. For the sake of illustration, we present only the automaton (depicted
below) that recognizes tests of the form w = w′ such that the corresponding term
is actually a constant.
Intuitively, the basic building blocks (e.g. q0 with the transitions from q0 to
itself) mimic an execution of P where each input is fed with the last outputted
term. Then, to recognize the tests of the form w = w′ that are true in such
an execution, it is sufficient to memorize the constant si that is associated to w
(adding a new state qi), and to see whether it is possible to reach a state where
the stack contains si again.
Capturing tests that lead to non-constant symbols (i.e. terms of the form
senc(u, k, r)) is more tricky for several reasons. First, it is not possible anymore
to memorize the resulting term in a state of the automaton. Second, names of
sort rand play a role in such a test, while they are forgotten in our encoding.
We therefore have to, first, characterize more precisely trace equivalence and
secondly, construct more complex automata that use some special track symbols
to encode when randomized ciphertexts may be reused.
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q0
q1
q`
qf
...
...
qk
ci;uij/v
i
j
ci;uij/v
i
j
ci;uij/v
i
j
ci;uij/v
i
j
con
st;
ωs1
/ω
const;ωsk/ω
const;ωs` /ω
const;ωs1/ω
const;ωsk/ω
con
st;ω
s`/ω
5 From language equivalence to trace equivalence
We have just seen how to encode equivalence of processes in Cpp into real-time
GPDA. The equivalence of processes in Cpp is actually equivalent to language
equivalence of real-time GPDA. Indeed, we can conversely encode any a real-
time GPDA into a process in Cpp, preserving equivalence. The transformation
works as follows.
Given a word α1. . . . .αp, for sake of concision, the expression x.u will denote
either the term senc(. . . senc(x, α1, z1), . . .), αp, zp) when it occurs as an input
term; or senc(. . . senc(x, α1, r1), . . .), αp, rp) when it occurs as an output term.
Then given an automaton A = (Q,Π,Γ, q0, ω,Qf , δ), the corresponding process
PA is defined as follows:
PA
def
= ! in(c0, start).new r.out(c0, senc(ω, q0, r))
| ! in(ca, senc(x.u, q, z)).new r˜.out(ca, senc(x.v, q′, r))
| ! in(cf , senc(x, qf , z)).out(cf , start)
| P ′A
where a quantifies over Π, q over Q, u over words in Γ∗ such that (q, a, u) ∈
dom(δ), qf over Qf , and (q′, v) = δ(q, a, u).
Intuitively, the stack of the automata A is encoded as a pile of encryptions
(where each key encodes a tile of the stack). Then, upon receiving a stack s
encrypted by q on channel ca, the process PA mimics the transition of A at
state q and stack s, upon reading a. The resulting stack is sent encrypted by
the resulting state. This polynomial encoding (with some additional technical
details hidden in P ′A) preserves equivalence.
Proposition 2. Let A and B be two real-time GPDA: L(A) ⊆ L(B)⇐⇒ PA v
PB.
Therefore, checking for equivalence of protocols is as difficult as checking
equivalence of real-time generalized pushdown deterministic automata. It fol-
lows that the exact complexity of checking equivalence of protocols is unknown.
The only upper bound is that equivalence is at most primitive recursive. This
bound comes from the algorithm proposed by C. Stirling for equivalence of
DPA [?] (Icalp 2002). Whether equivalence of DPA (or even real-time GPDA)
is e.g. at least NP-hard is unknown.
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6 Conclusion
We have shown a first decidability result for equivalence of security protocols for
an unbounded number of sessions by reducing it to the equality of languages of
deterministic pushdown automata. We further show that deciding equivalence
of security protocols is actually at least as hard as deciding equality of languages
of deterministic, generalized, real-time pushdown automata.
Our class of security protocols handles only randomized primitives, namely
symmetric/asymmetric encryptions and signatures. Our decidability result could
be extended to handle deterministic primitives instead of the randomized one
(the reverse encoding - from real-time GPDAs to processes with deterministic
encryption - may not hold anymore). Due to the use of pushdown automata,
extending our decidability result to protocols with pair is not straightforward.
A direction is to use pushdown automata for which stacks are terms.
G. Sénizergues is currently implementing his procedure for pushdown au-
tomata [?]. As soon as the tool will be available, we plan to implement our
translation, yielding a tool for automatically checking equivalence of security
protocols, for an unbounded number of sessions.
Inria
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A Undecidability results
This section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 2 introduced in Section 3.2.
Theorem 2. Let P and Q be two protocols in Cpp. The problem whether P is
trace included in Q, i.e. P v Q, is undecidable.
To prove the undecidability of trace inclusion in Cpp, we show it is possible
to encode the Post Correspondence Problem into an inclusion of two protocols
of this class. Given a word, one protocol will be meant to unstack the first
set of tiles while the other will try as much as possible to unstack the second
set of tiles. While an empty word is not “simultaneously” reached by the two
processes, their traces appear to be equivalent. On the other hand, if a solution
to the Post Correspondence Problem does exit, it will lead the second process
to react in a distinct way, breaking the trace inclusion property.
Let PCP be an instance of the Post Correspondence Problem over the al-
phabet A, with sets of non-empty tiles U = {ui}1≤i≤n and V = {vi}1≤i≤n. We
can then define:
∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n},

Wi = A
|vi| r {vi}
W ′i =
|vi|−1⋃
k=1
Ak
Words in A∗ will be represented through nested symmetric encryption with
private keys representing their counterparts in A. For the sake of brevity, given
a word u = α1 . . . αp of A∗, we will denote by x.u:
• either the term senc(. . . senc(x, α1, y1) . . . , αp, yp) where y1 through yp are
variables of sort rand when x.u is used as an input pattern;
• or the term senc(. . . senc(x, α1, n1) . . . , αp, np) where n1 through np are
names when x.u occurs in an output pattern.
We denote by r˜ the sequence of new ri that binds every nonce in the following
output.
Below, ki, k′i with i ∈ {0, 1, 2, 3} are constants in Σ0 of sort key, and for
each a ∈ A, we denote also by a its counterpart in Σ0 (constants of sort key).
Lastly, we denote  a constant in Σ0 of sort msg, and c, ca, ci, c′ with a ∈ A and
i ∈ {1, . . . , n} are constant symbols in Ch.
Let PU and PV be the following protocols. Note that PU and PV are both in
Cpp.
PU := ! in(c, start).new r.out(c, senc(, k0, r)) (start)
| ! in(ca, senc(x, k0,_)).new r˜.out(ca, senc(senc(x, a, r2), k0, r1)) (1)
| ! in(ci, senc(x.ui, k0,_)).new r.out(ci, senc(x, k1, r)) (2)
| ! in(ci, senc(x.ui, k1,_)).new r.out(ci, senc(x, k1, r)) (3)
| ! in(c′, senc(, k1,_)).new r.out(c′, senc(, k2, r)) (4)
where i ranges in {1, . . . , n} and a in A.
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PV := ! in(c, start).new r.out(c, senc(, k
′
0, r)) (start)
| ! in(ca, senc(x, k′0,_)).new r˜.out(ca, senc(senc(x, a, r2), k′0, r1)) (1)
| ! in(ci, senc(x.vi, k′0,_)).new r.out(ci, senc(x, k′1, r)) (2′)
| ! in(ci, senc(x.vi, k′1,_)).new r.out(ci, senc(x, k′1, r)) (3′)
| ! in(ci, senc(x.w, k′0,_)).new r˜.out(ci, senc(x.w, k′3, r1)) (2′a)
| ! in(ci, senc(x.w, k′1,_)).new r˜.out(ci, senc(x.w, k′3, r1)) (3′a)
| ! in(ci, senc(w′, k′0,_)).new r.out(ci, senc(w′, k′3, r)) (2′b)
| ! in(ci, senc(w′, k′1,_)).new r.out(ci, senc(w′, k′3, r)) (3′b)
| ! in(ci, senc(x, k′3,_)).new r.out(ci, senc(x, k′3, r)) (5′)
| ! in(c′, senc(, k′1,_)).out(c′, start) (4′)
| ! in(c′, senc(x.α, k′1,_)).new r˜.out(c′, senc(x.α, k′2, r1)) (4′a)
| ! in(c′, senc(x, k′3,_)).new r.out(c′, senc(x, k′2, r)) (4′b)
where i ranges in {1, . . . , n}, a and α in A, and for each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, w in Wi
and w′ in W ′i .
Lemma 1. We have that PU v PV if, and only if, PCP has no solution.
Proof. We prove successively the two implications.
(⇒) If PCP has a solution then PU 6v PV . If PCP has a solution, there exists
a word u = α1 . . . αm ∈ A+, p ∈ N and (ik)1≤k≤p ∈ Np such that
u = ui1 · . . . · uip = vi1 · . . . · vip .
From this word and sequence, the attacker can build the term u∗ representing
the word α1 . . . αm from the letters αi ∈ A with branches (1) and then output
one by one the tiles uip to ui1 using (2) and (3). Let tr be the trace of the
protocol PU following the sequence i1, . . . , ip:
tr
def
= in(c, start).out(c,w1).in(cα1 ,w1).out(cα1 ,w2) . . . in(cαm ,wm).out(cαm ,wm+1).
in(cip ,wm+1).out(cip ,wm+2) . . . in(ci1 ,wp+m).out(ci1 ,wp+m+1).
in(c′,wm+p+1).out(c′,wm+p+2)
The trance tr models the fact that, given u∗, PU can remove one by one the tiles
uip to ui1 to reach the empty word and hence output the message senc(, k2, r).
In this execution, except for the first input on channel c, the only input recipes
are variables of the frame wk and no equality holds in the resulting frame φ,
as the attacker ignores the keys that are used to encrypt, and all outputted
message use different random seeds; thus all messages look fresh.
We claim that there exists no equivalent trace in PV . Indeed, as the pattern
matching operated by process parts (2′), (3′), (2′a), (3′a) and (2′b), (3′b) is
exclusive, given u∗ as an input (which is necessary as the channels used to build
it are known to the attacker), PV has no choice but to remove tiles vip ∈ Vip to
vi1 ∈ Vi1 and output start on channel c′ as u is a Post word. Any other trace
would either lead to a mismatch on the channels or an improper filtering in PV .
Then the test wm+p+2 = start is evaluated to true in ψ (the frame resulting
from this execution in PV ) but false in φ. So (tr, φ) has no equivalent trace in
PV , i.e. PU 6v PV .
(⇐) If PCP has no solution then PU v PV . First, note that, the only way for
the attacker to build a trace is to start with branch (start) and use an arbitrary
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number of times the branches (1) before having to be able to fire any subsequent
one. For this reason, any trace (tr, φ) of PU can be associated to a set of words
u∗ ∈ A∗, obtained from the different uses of branches (1). If u∗ = , because
transition (4) can only be fired with a ciphertext with key k1 and the tiles of
U are non-empty, then the trace actually consists on branch (start) only, which
has an obvious equivalent in PV . Given a trace (tr, φ) ∈ trace(PU ), we aim
at showing there exists an equivalent trace (tr, ψ) ∈ trace(PV ). Two cases can
occur for any trace (tr, φ) ∈ trace(PU ):
• tr contains no input on channel c′: then φ contains no equalities, due to
fresh nonces for every output and ignorance of the keys. (tr, ψ) can be built
by following the sequence of channels used in tr and choosing the adequate
filtering ((2′), (3′), (2′a), (3′a), (2′b) or (3′c)). It is always possible to do
so, as the definition of sets Wi and W ′i ensure that every term built by the
attacker can be handled on any channel ci. As for φ, the frame ψ will not
contain any equality, hence demonstrating the equivalence of (tr, φ) and
(tr, ψ).
• tr contains an input on channel c′: then a word u∗ associated to tr, as
mentioned before, is made of tiles of Ui. Indeed, the only way to activate
an input on c′ is to go through the branches (2) and (3) by unstacking the
said tiles. Then, because PCP has no solution, such a word u∗ cannot
be a Post word and thus u∗ cannot be decomposed in tiles of Vi with the
same sequence of indices: because the filtering in PV is also exhaustive,
messages outputted by PV (up to replays) from a certain point will be
encrypted by k′3, which will enable PV , through the part (5′), to match
inputs and outputs on any channel ci. Finally, parts (4′a) and (4′b) allow
PV to match the outputs of PU on c′. For the same reason as before, φ
and ψ are statically equivalent as the messages appears to be random to
the attacker and thus contain no equalities.
Hence, for all traces of PU there exists an equivalent trace of PV , i.e. PU v
PV .
Theorem 2 directly follows from Lemma 1 and the undecidability of the Post
Correspondence Problem.
B Getting rid of the attacker
This section is devoted to the proof of Proposition 1 introduced in Section 4.2.
Proposition 1. Let P and Q be two protocols in Cpp. We have that:
P ≈ Q if, and only if, P ′ ≈fwd Q′ for some (P ′, Q′) ∈ Tfwd(P,Q).
The general proof is articulated as follows: we first show in Lemma 3 that, for
protocols in Cpp, our semantics can be restricted slightly by enforcing outputs
right after their corresponding inputs without altering our definition of trace
equivalence. Then, in Lemma 5, we show that deducible keys can actually be
given a priori to the attacker for such protocols, enabling us in Lemma 6 to
prove that trace equivalence with respect to a forwarder for protocols whose
deducible keys are revealed is itself equivalent to regular trace equivalence in
our setting. Proposition 1 finally wraps those lemmas together.
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Lemma 2. Let P and Q be two protocols in Cpp. We have that:
P ≈ Q if, and only if, P |!in(c, x).out(c, x) ≈ Q |!in(c, x).out(c, x)
where c is a channel name that does not occur in P and Q.
Proof. Obvious. It just enables the attacker to store computations inside the
frame.
The height of a recipe is defined as expected, to be 0 for constants and
variables and to be 1 plus the maximum height of its arguments for a term with
a function as a top-level symbol.
Lemma 3 (equivalence of semantics). Let P and Q be two protocols in Cpp. We
have that P ≈ Q in the usual semantics described in Section 2.2 if, and only if,
P |!in(c, x).out(c, x) ≈ Q|!in(c, x).out(c, x) in the semantics where c is a channel
name that does not occur in P and Q, and:
1. every trace is made of segments in(ci, R).out(ci,w) for various channel
names ci and variables of the frame w,
2. recipes in every input of the trace on a channel different from c are vari-
ables of the frame or the constant start,
3. recipes in every input on channel c are of maximal height 1,
4. recipes in the definition of static equivalence are variables of the frames
only or the constant start.
Proof. Let (tr, φ) be a trace of P , we define inductively (t¯r, φ¯) ∈ trace(P ) to be
a new trace satisfying the conditons of Lemma 3:
• if tr does not contain any output: then (t¯r, φ¯) is the empty trace with the
empty frame,
• if tr = in(ci, R).tr1.out(ci,w).tr2, where in(ci, R) is the first input of tr and
out(ci,w) its corresponding output in tr. If R is of height M , because
encryption and decryption have to be made with atomic keys only, R is
composed of M − 1 encryption or decryption symbols. If we call Rk the
term at depth M − k, Rk = senc(u, v, w) or Rk = sdec(u, v) where u is a
term and v, w are constants, names or variable of dom(φ). Then:
t¯r = in(c,R′1).out(c,w1) . . . in(c,R
′
M ).out(c,wM ).in(ci,wM ).out(ci,w).tr1.tr2
where w1, . . . ,wM are new variables in the frame, R′1 = R1 and R′k =
Rk{u 7→ wk−1} for k ∈ {2, . . . ,M}. Note that variables in input may
have to be reindexed to fit with our semantics. If (tr, φ) ∈ trace(P ) then
(t¯r, φ¯) ∈ trace(P ). Moreover, terms of φ are present in φ¯.
Moreover notice that this transformation is deterministic: to a sequence of labels
tr we can associate a unique t¯r; and t¯r satisfies all of the needed properties. If
P ≈ Q, then we directly get that P |!in(c, x).out(c, x) ≈ Q|!in(c, x).out(c, x)
thanks to Lemma 2 and because the constraints in the new semantics actually
reduces symmetrically the set of traces of P and Q. What remains to show
is that if P 6≈ Q, then P |!in(c, x).out(c, x) 6≈ Q|!in(c, x).out(c, x) in the new
semantics. For instance, let (tr, φ) be a trace of P . Two cases can occur:
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• either there exists no frame ψ such that (tr, ψ) ∈ trace(Q). Indeed, in such
a case (t¯r, φ¯) ∈ trace(P ) but there exists no frame ψ¯ such that (t¯r, ψ¯) ∈
trace(Q). Indeed, if we consider the first input of tr which fails in Q, the
corresponding input of t¯r will fail too as its frame contains the same terms
as the frame generated so far in Q.
• or there exists a frame ψ such that (tr, ψ) ∈ trace(Q), two recipes R1, R2
such that, e.g. R1 = R2 holds in φ but not in ψ.
Similarly to what has been done to define R′1 to R′M from R in the def-
inition of t¯r, we can extend t¯r once more. We decompose R1 (resp. R2)
into a sequence of recipes R′1 to R′M (resp. R
′′
1 to R′′N ) and define tr
∗ as
follows:
tr∗ = t¯r· in(c,R′1).out(c,w|φ¯|+1) . . . in(c,R′M ).out(c,w|φ¯|+M ).
in(c,R′′1 ).out(c,w|φ¯|+M+1) . . . in(c,R
′′
N ).out(c,w|φ¯|+M+N )
and φ∗ = φ¯∪{w|φ¯|+1 . u1 . . .w|φ¯|+M+N . uM+N}; and (tr∗, ψ∗) ∈ trace(Q)
is defined symmetrically. Because terms in φ (resp. in ψ) are present in φ¯
and φ∗ (resp. ψ¯ and ψ∗), the equality will be true un φ¯ and false in ψ¯ if,
and only if, w|φ¯|+M = w|φ¯|+M+N is true in φ∗ but false in ψ∗.
Hence equivalence is preserved with our new semantics.
From now on, we will always consider the alternative semantics defined in
Lemma 3, and every considered trace will meet the specified requirements. In
particular, we always assume protocols contain the branch !in(c, x).out(c, x).
Definition 5. Let P be a protocol in Cpp (with a branch !in(c, x).out(c, x)). A
term t is deducible in P if there exists a trace (tr, φ) of P and w ∈ dom(φ) such
that wφ = t.
Lemma 4. Let P and Q be two protocols in Cpp, KP (resp. KQ) be the set of
deducible constants of sort key that occur in P (resp. Q), if P ≈ Q then there
exists a unique bijection α from KP to KQ such that for every trace (tr, φ) ∈
trace(P ) there exists a trace (tr, ψ) ∈ trace(Q) such that for any recipe R and
any k ∈ KP :
• Rφ↓ is of sort s if, and only if, Rψ↓ is of sort s; where s ∈ {SimKey,PubKey,PrivKey}.
• Rφ↓ = k if, and only if, Rψ↓ = α(k); and symmetrically for Q.
• Rφ↓ = k−1 if, and only if, Rψ↓ = (α(k))−1.
Proof. We can describe α as a relation in the following way: for every k ∈ KP
of sort s, and every trace (tr, φ) ∈ trace(P ) and every w ∈ dom(φ) such that
wφ = k, we define α(k) = wψ where ψ is the only frame such that (tr, ψ) ∈ Q.
The existence of such a frame comes from the trace equivalence of P and Q,
whereas unicity is a consequence of the determinism of protocols in Cpp.
We now need to prove that our definition of α is sound and unambiguous.
To do so, we show that:
• wψ is a constant of sort s. We have that there exists a trace (tr, φ) ∈
trace(P ) such that wφ = k ∈ KP . Since P ≈ Q, consider the correspond-
ing equivalence trace (tr, ψ) ∈ trace(Q). By definition of static equiva-
lence, we necessarily have that wψ is a constant of sort s. Otherwise, we
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would have that senc(start,w, ri)φ ∈ T (Σ,N ) whereas senc(start,w, ri)ψ 6∈
T (Σ,N ) if s = SimKey(it is not properly sorted). The same argument ap-
plies with aenc and sign for s equal to PubKey and PrivKey respectively.
• |KP | = |KQ|. Suppose ad absurdum that, for instance, |KP | < |KQ|.
Because every element of KQ is deducible, there exists (tr, ψ) ∈ trace(Q)
such that for all k ∈ KQ, there exists wk ∈ dom(ψ) such that wkψ = k. In
particular, if k 6= k′, wkψ 6= wk′ψ. Because P ≈ Q, there exists a frame
φ such that (tr, φ) ∈ trace(P ). As |KP | < |KQ|, there exist two distinct
keys k and k′ such that wkφ = wk′φ, keys in ψ have to be matched by
keys in φ according to the previous item. Hence φ and ψ are not statically
equivalent, contradicting the trace equivalence of P and Q.
• α is indeed a function. Suppose there exist a trace (tr, φ) ∈ trace(P ),
wi ∈ dom(φ) and a corresponding equivalence trace (tr, ψ) ∈ trace(Q) such
that wiφ = k and wiψ = k′; a trace (tr′, φ′) ∈ trace(P ), wj ∈ dom(φ′) and
a corresponding equivalence trace (tr′, ψ′) ∈ trace(Q) such that wjφ′ = k
but wjψ′ = k′′ with k′ 6= k′′. Consider the trace tr · tr′. Up to a reindexing
of the variables and renaming of some names in φ′ and ψ′, (tr ·tr′, φ∪φ′) ∈
trace(P ) and (tr · tr′, ψ ∪ ψ′) ∈ trace(P ). Then test wi = w|φ|+j would be
true in φ ∪ φ′ but false in ψ ∪ ψ′ as soon as k′ 6= k′′.
Then we show that α is an injection: given k, k′ two distinct elements of
KP , α(k) 6= α(k′): suppose, as previously, there exist a trace (tr, φ) ∈ trace(P ),
wi ∈ dom(φ) and a corresponding equivalence trace (tr, ψ) ∈ trace(Q) such that
wiφ = k and wiψ = α(k); a trace (tr′, φ′) ∈ trace(P ), wj ∈ dom(φ′) and a
corresponding equivalence trace (tr′, ψ′) ∈ trace(Q) such that wjφ′ = k′ but
wjψ
′ = α(k) with k 6= k′. Consider the trace tr.tr′. Up to a reindexing of the
variables in φ′ and ψ′, (tr.tr′, φ ∪ φ′) ∈ trace(P ) and (tr.tr′, ψ ∪ ψ′) ∈ trace(P ).
Then test wi = w|φ|+j would be true in φ ∪ φ′ but false in ψ ∪ ψ′.
We prove now that α satisfies the second condition on recipes. If Rφ↓ is
a message, then so is Rψ↓, by definition of static equivalence. Then the same
arguments as those developped in the definition of α can be extended to arbitrary
recipes, hence proving the existence of α.
To show that α satisfies the last condition on recipes, suppose that k ∈
KP ,Rφ↓ = k−1. As previously shown, Rψ↓ = α(k−1). We want to prove that
α(k−1) = (α(k))−1. If k is of sort SimKey, the result is obvious as k−1 = k for
any such key. Suppose k is of sort PubKey. We have now that there exists a
trace (tr, φ) ∈ trace(P ) such that wφ = k ∈ KP . Since P ≈ Q, consider the
corresponding equivalence trace (tr, ψ) ∈ trace(Q). Consider the recipes R1 =
aenc(start,w, n) and R2 = adec(R1, R). Then R2φ↓ = start and R2ψ↓ = start if,
and only if, Rψ↓ = (wψ)−1. As we have already proved that α preserves sorts,
we get that R2ψ↓ is of sort msg if, and only if, α(k−1) = Rψ↓ = wψ = (α(k))−1.
Hence α is compatible with the inverse function. The same argument can be
used if k is of sort PrivKey with sign and check.
Finally we prove the unicity of such a bijection: suppose there were α′ an
adequate bijection and k ∈ KP such that α(k) 6= α′(k). By definition of α,
for every trace (tr, φ) ∈ trace(P ) and every w ∈ dom(φ) such that wφ = k,
α(k) = wψ. But as α′ satisfy a similar properties on recipes, with R = w, we
get that wψ = α′(k), contradicting our hypothesis. Hence α is unique.
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Definition 6 (disclosing keys). Let P be a protocol in Cpp, K be a set of con-
stants of sort key that occur in P . If for every k ∈ K there exist a channel name
ck and a branch !in(ck, start).out(ck, k) in P , then P is said to disclose K.
Lemma 5. Let P and Q be two protocols in Cpp, S (resp. S′) the set of key of
P (resp. Q), P ≈ Q if, and only if, there exist two sets K ⊆ S and K ′ ⊆ S′
and a bijection α : K → K ′ such that P¯ ≈ Q¯ where:
P¯ = P | !in(c0, start).out(c0, 0)|!in(c1, start).out(c1, 1)
| |
k∈K
!in(ck,α(k), start).out(ck,α(k), k)| |
k∈SrK
!in(c, k).out(c, 0)
Q¯ = Q | !in(c0, start).out(c0, 0)|!in(c1, start).out(c1, 1)
| |
k∈K
!in(ck,α(k), start).out(ck,α(k), α(k))| |
k∈S′rK′
!in(c, k).out(c, 1)
and 0, 1 are new constants, c0, c1, the ck,α(k) and c are fresh channels. Moreover,
assuming the existence of such sets and bijection such that P¯ ≈ Q¯, the two
protocols are disclosing their deducible keys. We call T 1(P,Q) the set of such
pairs (P¯ , Q¯) of modified protocols.
Proof. If P ≈ Q, by Lemma 4, for K = KP and K ′ = KQ, we get the existence
of such a bijection α. Because keys in S r KP and S′ r KQ are not deducible,
the branches on channel c can never be triggered. Conversely, as P ≈ Q, any
trace of P (resp. Q) inputting or outputting on a channel ck,α(k) for k in KP
can be matched in Q (resp. P ) as any reduction to a key k in P corresponds to
a reduction to α(k) in Q and for every couple (k, k−1) of deducible keys, for any
recipe reducing to k−1 in P , the same recipe reduces to α(k)−1 in Q, thanks to
the properties of α described in Lemma 4.
For the converse implication, remark that necessarily KP ⊆ K and KQ ⊆ K ′:
otherwise suppose there exists, for instance, k ∈ KPrK. Because k is deducible,
there exists a trace (tr, φ) ∈ trace(P ) and w ∈ dom(φ) such that wφ = k. (tr, φ)
is also a trace of P¯ . Consider the trace
tr′ = tr.in(c,w).out(c,w|φ|+1).in(c0, start).out(c0,w|φ|+2).in(c1, start).out(c1,w|φ|+3)
along with its frame φ′ = φ ∪ {w|φ|+1 . 0,w|φ|+2 . 0,w|φ|+3 . 1}. If P¯ ≈ Q¯, then
there exists (tr′, ψ′) ∈ trace(Q¯) such that φ and ψ are statically equivalent. But
any output on c in Q leads to the constant 1, breaking static equivalence. And
symmetrically for any k ∈ KQ rK ′.
Finally we need to prove that P¯ ≈ Q¯ implies P ≈ Q. For every trace (tr, φ) ∈
trace(P ), (tr, φ) ∈ trace(P¯ ), and as P¯ ≈ Q¯, there exists a trace (tr, ψ) ∈ trace(Q¯)
such that φ is statically equivalent to ψ. Because c0, c1, c and the ck,α(k) are new
channels, tr does not use transitions on those, thus (tr, ψ) ∈ trace(Q). The same
goes for any trace of Q, hence showing the trace equivalence of P and Q.
We shall now use the forwarder as defined in Section 4.2.
Lemma 6 (active attacker vs. forwarder). Let P and Q be two protocols in Cpp
respectively disclosing two sets of keys K and K ′ as in Lemma 5. Then P ≈ Q
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if, and only if, P¯ ≈fwd Q¯ where:
P¯ = P | |
k∈KSimKey
!in(csenck,α(k), x).new n.out(ck,α(k), senc(x, k, n))
| |
k∈KSimKey
!in(csdeck,α(k), senc(x, k, y)).out(c
sdec
k,α(k), x)
| |
k∈KPubKey
!in(caenck,α(k), x).new n.out(c
aenc
k,α(k), aenc(x, k, n))
| |
k∈KPrivKey
!in(cadeck,α(k), aenc(x, k, y)).out(c
adec
k,α(k), x)
| |
k∈KPrivKey
!in(csignk,α(k), x).new n.out(c
sign
k,α(k), sign(x, k, n))
| |
k∈KPubKey
!in(ccheckk,α(k), sign(x, k, y)).out(c
check
k,α(k), x)
Q¯ = Q | |
k∈KSimKey
!in(csenck,α(k), x).new n.out(c
senc
k,α(k), senc(x, α(k), n))
| |
k∈KSimKey
!in(csdeck,α(k), senc(x, α(k), y)).out(c
sdec
k,α(k), x)
| |
k∈KPubKey
!in(caenck,α(k), x).new n.out(c
aenc
k,α(k), aenc(x, α(k), n))
| |
k∈KPrivKey
!in(cadeck,α(k), aenc(x, α(k), y)).out(c
adec
k,α(k), x)
| |
k∈KPrivKey
!in(csignk,α(k), x).new n.out(c
sign
k,α(k), sign(x, α(k), n))
| |
k∈KPubKey
!in(ccheckk,α(k), check(x, α(k), y)).out(c
check
k,α(k), x)
where Ks denotes the keys of sort s of K. We call T 2 the transformation taking
a pair of protocols (P,Q) satisfying the aforementioned condition and returning
the pair (P¯ , Q¯) presently defined.
Proof. We recall, that, as a consequence of Lemma 5, we necessarily have that
KP ⊆ K and KQ ⊆ K ′. Because protocols P and P¯ (resp. Q and Q¯) disclose
all their deducible keys, their exists a trace (tr0, φ0) of P and P¯ (resp. (tr0, ψ0)
a trace of Q and Q¯) defined as follows:
tr0 = in(ck1,α(k1), start).out(ck1,α(k1),w
0
1) . . . in(ckn,α(kn), start).out(ckn,α(kn),w
0
n)
for k1, . . . , kn ∈ KP , and φ0 = {w01 . k1, . . .w0n . kn}, and symmetrically for Q
and Q¯. We can always assume a trace of P or P¯ (resp. of Q or Q¯) starts with
the prefix tr0 and contains the frame φ0.
First, suppose P¯ 6≈fwd Q¯: for instance, suppose there exists (tr, φ) ∈ trace(P¯ )
such that there is no equivalent frame ψ such that (tr, ψ) ∈ trace(Q¯). Let us
define a corresponding trace (tr′, φ) ∈ trace(P ):
• every sequence in(csenck,α(k),w).out(c
senc
k,α(k),w
′) in tr is replaced by the sequence
in(c, senc(w,w0k, n)).out(c,w
′) in tr′ where n is a fresh name, which is a
recipe of height 1.
• every sequence in(csdeck,α(k),w).out(c
sdec
k,α(k),w
′) in tr is replaced by the sequence
in(c, sdec(w,w0k)).out(c,w
′) in tr′ which is a recipe of height 1.
• every sequence in(caenck,α(k),w).out(c
aenc
k,α(k),w
′) in tr is replaced by the sequence
in(c, aenc(w,w0k, n)).out(c,w
′) in tr′ where n is a fresh name, which is a
recipe of height 1.
Inria
From security protocols to pushdown automata 23
• every sequence in(cadeck,α(k),w).out(c
adec
k,α(k),w
′) in tr is replaced by the sequence
in(c, adec(w,w0k)).out(c,w
′) in tr′ which is a recipe of height 1.
• every sequence in(csignk,α(k),w).out(c
sign
k,α(k),w
′) in tr is replaced by the sequence
in(c, sign(w,w0k, n)).out(c,w
′) in tr′ where n is a fresh name, which is a
recipe of height 1.
• every sequence in(ccheckk,α(k),w).out(c
check
k,α(k),w
′) in tr is replaced by the sequence
in(c, check(w,w0k)).out(c,w
′) in tr′ which is a recipe of height 1.
We claim that there exists no frame ψ such that (tr′, ψ) ∈ trace(Q) with φ ∼ ψ.
Indeed, because the frame are left unchanged, the input recipes match the same
input patterns, and recipes holding true and false keep their truth values. So
if such a frame ψ existed, (tr, ψ) would belong to trace(Q¯) and be equivalent to
(tr, φ).
Now, suppose P 6≈ Q: consider the shortest trace (tr, φ) ∈ trace(P ), in terms
of number of transitions, such that there is no equivalent frame ψ satisfying
(tr, ψ) ∈ trace(Q).
Through recipes of the form senc(u, v, w) on channel c, the attacker has the
ability to use the same random seed more that once. Let us first show that we
can always assume tr uses nonces at most once. If it is not the case, we build
a new trace (t˜r, φ˜), such that φ is statically equivalent to φ˜ for which it is the
case. Suppose a random seed r is used in two recipes, two cases can occur:
• r is used with two different keys, two different plaintexts or two different
function symbols: because random seeds are not filtered in our semantics,
the sequence of labels where an occurence of r is replaced by a distinct r′
is still a trace of P . And as equality between ciphertexts implies equality
between their keys, between their plaintexts and between their function
symbols, changing r into r′ does not prevent any existing equality, nor
introduce any. Thus we can replace r in t˜r by a new r′. We claim that,
if there existed ψ such that (tr, ψ) ∈ trace(Q), then either the keys, the
plaintexts or the function symbols in the two recipes are different in ψ.
Indeed, if it were not the case, consider the shorter trace (tr′, φ′) obtained
by deleting the transitions with the second occurence of the recipe and any
later transitions. Similarly (tr′, ψ′) would be a shorter trace of Q. Because
terms in φ′ (resp. ψ′) were already in φ (resp. ψ), the equality between
the keys, the plaintexts or the function symbols used for the recipes would
hold in ψ′ but not in φ′, thus exhibiting a witness of non-equivalence
shorter than the minimal one.
• r is used with the same key, plaintext and function symbol: as the terms
are identical, we can replace the later use of the recipe senc(u, v, w) by the
variable w ∈ dom(φ) corresponding to the output of the first occurence of
this term in t˜r. The frame of the new trace being the same as the initial
one, the same equalities hold. We claim that, if there exists ψ such that
(tr, ψ) ∈ trace(Q), then the terms used as keys, plaintexts and function
symbols for these recipes are identical in ψ too. As in the previous item,
if it were not the case, we could build a shorter witness of non-equivalence
between P and Q, contradicting the minimality assumption.
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In particular, we showed that modifiying tr into t˜r is a symmetric operation
which preserves equalities in the two protocols: identical plaintexts and keys
in (tr, φ) correspond to identical plaintexts and keys in (tr, ψ), whereas adding
fresh nonces does not create any equality in φ˜ or ψ˜. If (tr, φ) does not have any
equivalent trace in Q, neither has (t˜r, φ˜). If there exists no frame ψ such that
(tr, ψ) ∈ trace(Q), then there will exist no frame ψ˜ such that (t˜r, ψ˜) ∈ trace(Q)
as input filtering is not affected by our transformation. Else, if there exists ψ
such that (tr, ψ) ∈ trace(Q) but φ and ψ are not statically equivalent, because
our transformation preserves the terms in the frame, any pair of recipes which
distinguishes between the two of them, will distinguish φ˜ and ψ˜. So we can
always assume than the random seeds occuring in the recipes senc(u, v, w) in
(tr, φ) are distinct.
Let us now define a corresponding trace (t¯r, φ) ∈ trace(P¯ ). According to
Lemma 3, we may only consider the following pairs of input and outputs:
• the sequences in(ci,w).out(ci,w′), where ci 6= c, are left unchanged
• whereas each sequence in(c, f(w, x, n)).out(c,w′), where x = k or xφ = k
and f ∈ {senc, aenc, sign}, is replaced by in(cfk,α(k),w).out(cfk,α(k),w′);
• and each sequence in(c, g(w, x)).out(c,w′), where x = k or xφ = k and
g ∈ {sdec, adec, check}, is replaced by in(cgk,α(k),w).out(csdeck,α(k),w′).
The corresponding frame φ¯ is then defined according to our semantics.
Finally, because (t˜r, φ˜) ∈ trace(P ) has no equivalent in Q, and the definition
of (t¯r, φ¯) does not alter the filtering on inputs nor equalities between terms in
the frame, (t¯r, φ¯) has no equivalent in trace(Q¯).
Moreover, note that for every key in K (resp. in K ′), two branches of fixed
size are added to P¯ (resp. Q¯). T2 can thus be computed in polynomial time,
with respect to the size of its inputs.
Lemmas 5 and 6 enable us to define the transformation Tfwd introduced in
Section 4.2 as follows. For every pair of protocols (P,Q) in Cpp:
Tfwd(P,Q) = {T 2(P ′, Q′)|(P ′, Q′) ∈ T 1(P,Q)}
Combination of the two previous results leads to the desired result:
Proposition 1. Let P and Q be two protocols in Cpp. We have that:
P ≈ Q if, and only if, P ′ ≈fwd Q′ for some (P ′, Q′) ∈ Tfwd(P,Q).
C Encoding a protocol into a real-time GPDA
This section is devoted to the proof of Theorem 3 introduced in Section 4.3.
Theorem 3. Let P and Q in Cpp, we have that: P ≈fwd Q ⇐⇒ L(AP ) =
L(AQ).
To prove this theorem, we need to present a number of intermediate results.
The sketch goes as follows: we first prove in Lemma 10 that the notion of
equivalence introduced in Section 4.2 can be characterised as a conjonction of
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simpler properties on protocols in Cpp. The satisfaction of each pair of property
can then encoded into real-time GPDA as described in Lemma 11. The proof
of Theorem 3 resulting from the combination of the above lemmas.
Lemma 7. Given a protocol P in Cpp, a trace (tr, φ) ∈ trace(P ) and a variable
w ∈ dom(φ), there exists a unique sequence (ci0 ,wj0).(ci1 ,wj1) . . . (cip ,w) such
that the sequence in(ci0 , start).out(ci0 ,wj0) occurs in tr and for all k ∈ {1, . . . , p},
the sequence in(cik ,wjk−1).out(cik ,wjk) occurs in tr, where w is interpreted as
wjp .
Proof. Any term in φ is obtained by applying a branch cik to previous element
of the frame. By induction we get the desired result.
In the following, we denote by seqtr,φ(w) the sequence associated to the
element w ∈ dom(φ) as defined in Lemma 7. Given a term u, we call st(u)
the set of its subterms. A recipe w ∈ dom(φ) is said to be guarded if the head
symbol of wφ is an encryption symbol. If w and w′ are guarded, then the test
w = w′ is said to be guarded too.
Definition 7 (tests). Given a protocol P in Cpp, a trace (tr, φ) of P and a test
w = w′ where w,w′ ∈ dom(φ), two cases can occur:
• w = w′ is disjoint, i.e. seqtr,φ(w) and seqtr,φ(w′) share no common prefix.
• w = w′ is forked, i.e. seqtr,φ(w) and seqtr,φ(w′) share a common prefix.
Definition 8 (pulled-up test). Given a protocol P , a trace (tr, φ) of P , a
guarded forked test w = w′ where w,w′ ∈ dom(φ) with maximal common prefix
u = (i0,wj0) . . . (ip,wjp) is said to be pulled-up in (tr, φ) if resettr,φ(w) = jp
where resettr,φ is defined as follows:
if wφ = senc(u, k, n) then resettr,φ(w) = min1≤i≤|φ|{i | wφ ∈ st(wiφ)}.
Proof. This definition is indeed consistent: by definition of a guarded test, wφ is
an encryption with some random seed n. Because nonces are uniquely generated,
n has to appear in any term wkφ of seqtr,φ(w) occuring after resettr,φ(w). Thus
wφ is a subterm of any such wkφ, and in particular of wresettr,φ(w)φ.
Moreover, as protocols in Cpp are deterministic, given a sequence of labels tr
and a protocol P , there exists at most one frame φ such that (tr, φ) ∈ trace(P ).
Lemma 8. Let P and Q be two procotols in Cpp, if P ≈fwd Q then for every
trace (tr, φ) of P and every w,w′ ∈ dom(φ), if wφ = w′φ = c for some constant
c then wψ = w′ψ = c′ where ψ is the frame such that (tr, ψ) ∈ trace(Q) and c′
is a constant.
Proof. The only non-trivial point to prove is that if wφ = c, then wψ has
to be a constant. Because protocols in P allow replication for every branch,
consider the trace obtained by "replaying" tr in P and Q, i.e. given (tr, φ),
build (tr′, φ′) ∈ trace(P ) such that every couple input/output in tr appears
twice in tr′ with the same channel name. If tr is as follows:
tr = in(ci1 , start).out(ci1 ,w1) . . . in(cil ,wl).out(cil ,wm)
then tr′ is defined as:{
tr′ = tr.t¯r
t¯r = in(ci1 , start).out(ci1 ,w|φ|+1) . . . in(cil ,w|φ|+l).out(cil ,w|φ|+m)
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where every occurrence of start in tr is kept in t¯r but occurrences of wk are
replaced by w|φ|+k, |φ| being the cardinal of dom(φ); and tr.t¯r denotes the
concatenation of the two sequences of labels, which is a valid trace. We get
symmetrically (tr′, ψ′) ∈ trace(Q). In particular, there exists w∗ ∈ dom(φ′)
such that wφ′ = w∗φ′ = c and w = w∗ is disjoint (as the entire trace has been
duplicated). As P ≈fwd Q, necessarly wψ′ = w∗ψ′. Because the test is disjoint,
if w were guarded, wψ′ could not share the same top-level random seed as w∗ψ′.
Hence wψ is a constant.
Lemma 9. Let P and Q be two procotols in Cpp, if P ≈fwd Q then for every
trace (tr, φ) ∈ trace(P ) and every w,w′ ∈ dom(φ), if wφ = w′φ and w = w′ is
pulled-up in (tr, φ) then wψ = w′ψ and w = w′ is pulled-up in (tr, ψ) where ψ
is the frame such that (tr, ψ) ∈ trace(Q)
Proof. The only non-trivial point to prove is that if wφ = w′φ and w = w′ is
pulled-up in (tr, φ) then w = w′ is pulled-up in (tr, ψ). We can still assume that
w = w′ is guarded in ψ (it would otherwise contradict Lemma 8). Suppose it is
not the case:
1. if resettr,ψ(w) > resettr,φ(w): then wψ 6= w′ψ. Indeed, as resettr,ψ(w)
marks the first index in the frame where the top-level random seed of
wψ is introduced, having an equality would imply the common prefix of
seqtr,ψ(w) and seqtr,ψ(w′) to include wresettr,ψ(w) as nonces are uniquely
generated, but this prefix is the same as the common prefix of seqtr,φ(w)
and seqtr,φ(w′). Because the test is pulled-up in (tr, φ), this prefix ends
exactly with (ci,wresettr,φ(w)) for some channel ci. Hence resettr,φ(w) >
resettr,ψ(w), contradicting the hypothesis.
2. if resettr,ψ(w) < resettr,φ(w): we will show that P 6≈fwd Q as there exists a
trace (tr∗, ψ∗) ∈ trace(Q), w∗,w′∗ ∈ dom(ψ∗) such that w∗ψ∗ = w′∗ψ∗
but w∗φ∗ 6= w′∗φ∗, where φ∗ is defined as expected from our seman-
tics. If such a frame does not exist, it trivially contradicts our hyptoth-
esis. Let s be the maximal common prefix of seqtr,ψ(w) and seqtr,ψ(w′),
p = resettr,ψ(w). Necessarily there exists a channel name cip such that
(cip ,wp) ∈ s: indeed, as w = w′ is guarded and true in ψ, their ran-
dom seeds have to be identical and thus introduced at the same point in
the trace. Consequently, there exist three sequences s1, s2, s3 such that
s = s1.(cip ,wp).s2 and seqtr,ψ(w) = s.s3. Similarly, there exists s′3 such
that seqtr,ψ(w′) = s.s′3. From these sequences we can define (tr∗, ψ∗)
"corresponding" to pi1(s1.(cip ,wp).(s2.s3)) where pi1 denotes the general-
ized projection on the first component; and the according recipes w∗,w′∗
such that seqtr∗,ψ∗(w∗) = s1.(cip ,wp).s2.s3 for some wp ∈ dom(ψ∗) (up
to a reindexing of the indices of the variables wk in s1,s2 and s3) and
seqtr∗,ψ∗(w
′
∗) = s1.(cip ,wp).s2.s
′
3 = (up to another reindexing of the in-
dices of the variables wk in s1,s2 and s′3). More precisely, if seqtr,ψ(w′) =
s1.(cip ,wp).(ci1 ,wj1).(ci2 ,wj2) . . . (cil ,wjl): t¯r = in(ci1 ,wp).out(ci1 ,w|φ|+1).in(ci2 ,w|φ|+1).out(ci2 ,w|φ|+2). . . in(cil ,w|φ|+l−1).out(cil ,w|φ|+l)
tr∗ = tr.t¯r
and ψ∗ defined as expected from our semantics. Let w∗ = w and w′∗ =
w|φ|+l. We can now show that:
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(a) w∗ = w′∗ is pulled-up in (tr∗, ψ∗): s1.(ip,wp) is the longest common
prefix of seqtr∗,ψ∗(w∗) and seqtr∗,ψ∗(w
′
∗) by definition of tr∗.
(b) w∗ψ∗ = w′∗ψ∗: by definition of tr∗, w′∗ψ∗ and w′ψ are already equal up
to a renaming of random seeds, as the left components of seqtr,ψ(w′)
and seqtr∗,ψ∗(w
′
∗) match. As w∗ψ∗ = wψ = w′ψ, w∗ψ∗ and w′∗ψ∗ are
equal up to a renaming of their random seeds. According to Definition
8, w∗ψ∗ and w′∗ψ∗ are both subterms of wpψ∗, hence w∗ψ∗ = w′∗ψ∗.
Finally, as P ≈fwd Q, there exists φ∗ such that (tr∗, φ∗) ∈ trace(P ). But
now w∗ = w′∗ is true and pulled-up in (tr∗, ψ∗) and resettr∗,ψ∗(w∗) <
resettr∗,φ∗(w∗) since resettr,ψ(w) < resettr,φ(w). As shown in the previ-
ous bullet, it implies that w∗φ∗ 6= w′∗φ∗, contradicting the equivalence of
P and Q.
Lemma 10 (characterization of trace equivalence). Let P and Q be two pro-
tocols in Cpp, then P ≈fwd Q if, and only if, all of the following conditions are
true:
• for all (tr, φ) ∈ trace(P ), there exists a frame ψ such that (tr, ψ) ∈ trace(Q)
and for every w,w′ ∈ dom(φ) and for every constant c ∈ Σ0 ∪ {start},
wφ = w′φ = c if, and only if, there exists a constant c′ ∈ Σ0∪{start} such
that wψ = w′ψ = c′. (ConstP )
• and conversely. (ConstQ)
• for all (tr, φ) ∈ trace(P ), there exists a frame ψ such that (tr, ψ) ∈ trace(Q)
and every test that is true and pulled-up in (tr, φ) is true and pulled-up in
(tr, ψ). (ForkP )
• and conversely. (ForkQ)
Proof. The direct implication is an application of Lemmas 8 and 9.
Let us focus on the converse. Suppose P 6≈fwd Q. There exists for instance
a trace (tr, φ) of P such that either there exists no frame ψ such that (tr, ψ) ∈
trace(Q), in which case conditions ConstP and ForkP fail, or ψ is indeed
defined and there exists a test w = w′ which holds true in φ or ψ but fails in
the other. Let us assume that wφ = w′φ but wψ 6= w′ψ.
If wφ = w′φ = c for some constant c, then condition ConstP is false.
Else, if the test is guarded, from tr and w = w′ we will build a new trace
(tr∗, φ∗) and test w∗ = w′∗ which will be true and pulled-up in (tr∗, φ∗).
Let s be the maximal common prefix of seqtr,ψ(w) and seqtr,ψ(w′), p =
resettr,ψ(w). Necessarily there exists a channel name cip such that (cip ,wp) ∈ s:
indeed, as w = w′ is guarded and true in ψ, their random seeds have to be iden-
tical and thus introduced at the same point in the trace. Consequently, there
exist three sequences s1, s2, s3 such that s = s1.(cip ,wp).s2 and seqtr,ψ(w) =
s.s3. Similarly, there exists s′3 such that seqtr,ψ(w′) = s.s′3. From these se-
quences we can define (tr∗, ψ∗) "corresponding" to pi1(s1.(cip ,wp).(s2.s3)) where
pi1 denotes the generalized projection on the first component; and the accord-
ing recipes w∗,w′∗ such that seqtr∗,ψ∗(w∗) = s1.(cip ,wp).s2.s3 for some wp ∈
dom(ψ∗) (up to a reindexing of the indices of the variables wk in s1,s2 and
s3) and seqtr∗,ψ∗(w
′
∗) = s1.(cip ,wp).s2.s
′
3 = (up to another reindexing of the
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indices of the variables wk in s1,s2 and s′3). More precisely, if seqtr,ψ(w′) =
s1.(cip ,wp).(ci1 ,wj1).(ci2 ,wj2) . . . (cil ,wjl): t¯r = in(ci1 ,wp).out(ci1 ,w|φ|+1).in(ci2 ,w|φ|+1).out(ci2 ,w|φ|+2). . . in(cil ,w|φ|+l−1).out(cil ,w|φ|+l)
tr∗ = tr.t¯r
and ψ∗ defined as expected from our semantics. If w = wjk for some index jk in
ψ, w∗ = w in φ∗, and symmetrically for w′∗ = w|φ|+l. In particular, we have that
wφ = w∗φ∗. Now, either there exists no frame ψ∗ such that (tr∗, ψ∗) ∈ trace(Q),
in which case condition ForkP fails obviously, or such a frame exists. In this
case, we need then to show that:
1. w∗ = w′∗ is pulled-up in (tr∗, φ∗): s1.(cip ,wp) is the maximal common
prefix of seqtr∗,φ∗(w∗) and seqtr∗,φ∗(w
′
∗) by definition of tr∗.
2. w∗φ∗ = w′∗φ∗: by definition of tr∗, w′∗φ∗ and w′φ are already equal up
to a renaming of random seeds, as the left components of seqtr,φ(w′) and
seqtr∗,φ∗(w
′
∗) match. As w∗φ∗ = wφ = w′φ, w∗φ∗ and w′∗φ∗ are equal up
to a renaming of their random seeds. According to Definition 8, w∗φ∗ and
w′∗φ∗ are both subterms of wpφ∗, hence w∗φ∗ = w′∗φ∗.
3. w∗ψ∗ 6= w′∗ψ∗: similarly, we already know that wψ = w∗ψ∗. Suppose ad
absurdum that w∗ψ∗ = w′∗ψ∗. Because the left components of seqtr,ψ(w′)
and seqtr∗,ψ∗(w
′
∗) match, w′ψ and w′∗ψ∗ are either constant and equal or
cyphertexts and equal up to a renaming of their random seeds. In the first
case, it is enough to conclude that wψ = w′ψ, which is absurd. In the
second case, w∗ψ∗ and w′∗ψ∗ being randomized, must have equal top-level
random seeds, implying that this nonce was introduced before (cip ,wp)
in the common prefix of their respective sequences. As the said prefix is
also common, up to a reindexing of the wk, to w and w′, wψ and w′ψ
share the same top-level random seed and are thus equal, contradicting
our hypothesis. Threfore: w∗ψ∗ 6= w′∗ψ∗.
Hence ForkP is false. Finally if wψ = w′ψ but wφ 6= w′φ, conditions ForkQ
will similarly fail.
From this point on, we focus on building two classes automata, AConst
and AFork, whose language equivalence is itself equivalent to the properties
introduced in Lemma 10. In order to use terms in the stack of an automaton,
we introduce the following representation: given a term u we define inductively
u¯ in the following way: u¯ = v¯.k if u = f(v, k, n) and f ∈ {senc, aenc, sign}c¯ = c for any constant c
x¯ =  for any variable x
where  denotes the empty word.
Transitions are often written in a clearer way in the following fashion: a
transition from q to q′ reading a, popping u¯ from the stack and pushing v¯ will
be denoted by q
a;u¯/v¯−−−→ q′.
Lemma 11. Let P and Q be two protocols in Cpp, there exist four real-time
GPDA ARc for R in {P,Q} and c in {Const,Fork} such that:
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Figure 1: Automaton APConst
q0 q1 q2 qf
ci; u¯
j
i/v¯
j
i
bluei; u¯
j
i/ωv¯
j
i .(blue, i, j, |vji |)
ci; u¯
j∗
i /u¯
′j∗
i
red; (blue, i, j,m)/red.u¯′
ci; u¯
j
i/v¯
j
i
exit; red/
Figure 2: Automaton APFork
• P and Q satisfy conditions ConstP and ConstQ iff L(APConst) = L(AQConst)
• P and Q satisfy conditions ForkP and ForkQ iff L(APFork) = L(AQFork).
Proof. In the following, we denote by ΣP0 (resp. Σ
Q
0 ) the finite set of constants
of Σ0 ∪ {start} that actually occur in P (resp. Q). First, let us define APConst,
schematized in Figure 1:
APConst = ({q0, qf} ∪ {qs for every constant s},Π,Γ, q0, ω, {qf}, δ)
where
• Γ = ΣP0 ,
• Π = {c1, . . . , cn} ∪ {const}
• δ is defined as follows:
– From q0 to q0: for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and j ∈ {1, . . . , pi}, there
exists a transition (ci; u¯
j
i/v¯
j
i ) if v
j
i is not ground, or a transition
(ci; u¯
j
i/ωv¯
j
i ) if v
j
i is ground.
– From q0 to qs for every constant s: there exists a transition
(const;ωs/ω).
– From qs to qs for every constant s: for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and
j ∈ {1, . . . , pi}, there exists a transition (ci; u¯ji/v¯ji ) if vji is not ground,
or a transition (ci; u¯
j
i/ωv¯
j
i ) if v
j
i is ground.
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– From qs to qf for every constant s: there exists a transition
(const;ωs/ω).
Moreover we need to add in states q0 and qs a transition (cstart, ω/ω.start) to
put the constant start on the stack at first. The loops in q0 and qs are meant to
represent the construction of a term through a regular execution of the protocol
in a trace, unstacking as terms are filtered and stacking when outputting. The
transitions labeled (const;ωs/ω) are activated when a constant is reached and
enable the attacker to "memorize" which constant she reached, and to reach it
again in order to exhibit an equality between two terms of a frame.
APConst has a number of states polynomial in the number of constants in
P , and a number of transitions similar to the number of branches times the
maximal length of any term occuring in P . Thus, APConst is of size polynomial
with respect to the size of P .
We need to prove that P and Q satisfy conditions ConstP and ConstQ if,
and only if, L(APConst) = L(AQConst).
1. If L(APConst) 6= L(AQConst): suppose there exists a word u ∈ L(APConst)r
L(AQConst). Let us build a trace (tr, φ) ∈ trace(P ) "corresponding" to u:
let k1c and k2c be the positions in u of the two occurences of const and u0
be u stripped from these const. If u0 = ci1 .ci2 . . . cil , let us define tr as
follows:
tr = in(ci1 , start).out(ci1 ,w1) . . . in(cil ,wl−1).out(cil ,wl)
and φ is defined uniquely as expected from our semantics, as P is de-
terministic. (tr, φ) is indeed a valid trace of P as the transition function
δ fully captures input filtering and output of terms for protocols in Cpp.
We can now define w = wk1c−1 and w
′ = wk2c . Because the transitions
from q0 to qc and then from qc to qf for some constant c were possible,
we get that wφ = w′φ = c. As u /∈ L(AQConst), let q
a;α/β−−−−→ q′ be the
first failing transition in the run of u in AQConst: if q = q′, then a = ci
for some i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, meaning that there exists no frame ψ such that
(tr, ψ) ∈ trace(Q): ConstQ fails. On the other hand, if q = q0, q′ = qc for
some constant c, then wψ 6= c for any constant c: wψ is thus a ciphertext,
contradicting ConstQ. Last, if q = qc and q′ = qf for some constant c,
then wψ = c but wψ 6= c, making ConstQ fail once again. Hence P ans
Q do not satisfy ConstQ. Symmetrically, if u ∈ L(AQConst)rL(APConst),
ConstP is false.
2. If P and Q do not satisfy ConstP nor ConstQ: suppose ConstQ fails,
i.e. there exists a trace (tr, φ) of P , w,w′ ∈ dom(φ) and a constant c such
that wφ = w′φ = c but:
• either there exists no frame ψ of Q such that (tr, ψ) ∈ trace(Q)
• or wψ is not a constant
• or wψ is a constant but wψ 6= w′ψ
From tr we build a word u ∈ L(APConst): u = u1.const.u2.const with
u1 = pi1(seqtr,φ(w))
u2 = pi1(seqtr,φ(w
′))
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where pi1(x) denotes the generalised projection on the first component of
the sequence x. As the transition function δ fully captures input filtering
and output of terms for protocols in Cpp, we get that upon reading the first
const, APConst is in q0, the transition q0
const;ωc/ω−−−−−−→ qc is indeed possible
as wφ = c; and similarly upon reading the second const, APConst is in
qc, the transition qc
const;ωc/ω−−−−−−→ qf is indeed possible as w′φ = c, hence
u ∈ L(APConst). What remains to show is that u /∈ L(AQConst). Three
cases occur, corresponding to the previous highlighted situations:
• if (tr, ψ) can never be a valid trace of Q, a letter ci ∈ {1, . . . , n} will
not be read in state q0 or qc as the stack does not contain the adequate
symbols to enable the transition, reflecting the failed filtering on the
input on this channel
• if wψ is not a constant : no transition q0
const;ωc/ω−−−−−−→ qc will be possible
after u1
• if wψ is a constant c but wψ 6= w′ψ : the transition q0 const;ωc/ω−−−−−−→ qc
will not be possible after u2.
Hence u cannot belong to L(AQconst).
Therefore P and Q satisfy conditions ConstP and ConstQ iff L(APConst) =
L(AQConst).
Finally, let us define APFork, schematized in Figure 2:
APFork = ({q0, q1, q2, qf},Π,Γ, q0, ω, {qf}, δ)
where
• Γ = ΣP0 ∪{red}∪ (blue×{1, . . . , n}×{1, . . . ,maxi(pi)}×{1, . . . ,max
i,j
|vji |})
• Π = {c1, . . . , cn} ∪ {bluei}1≤i≤n ∪ {red, exit}
• δ is defined as follows:
– From q0 to q0: for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and j ∈ {1, . . . , pi}, there
exists a transition (ci; u¯
j
i/v¯
j
i ) if v
j
i is not ground, or a transition
(ci; u¯
j
i/ω.v¯
j
i ) if v
j
i is ground.
– From q0 to q1: for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and j ∈ {1, . . . , pi}, there
exists a transition (ci; u¯
j
i/ω.v¯
j
i .(blue, i, j, |vji |)).
– From q1 to q1: for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and j ∈ {1, . . . , pi}, for every
m ∈ {1, . . . ,max
i,j
|vji |} and for every suffix v¯ of u¯ji of length k < m such
that u¯ji = w¯.v¯ there exists a transition (ci; w¯.(blue, i, j,m).v¯/(blue, i, j,m−
k)v¯ji ), in addition to the same transitions as from q0 to q0.
– From q1 to q2: for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and j ∈ {1, . . . , pi}, for every
m ∈ {1, . . . , |vji |}, there exists a transition (red; (blue, i, j,m)/red.u′)
where u¯′ is the suffix of length |vji | −m of v¯ji .
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– From q2 to q2: for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and j ∈ {1, . . . , pi}, there
exists a transition (ci; u¯
j
i/v¯
j
i ) if v
j
i is not ground, or a transition
(ci; u¯
j
i/ω.v¯
j
i ) if v
j
i is ground.
– From q2 to qf : there exists a transition (exit; red/).
As in the previous automata, we need to add in states q0 a transition
(cstart, ω/ωstart) to put the constant start on the stack at first. The loop in
q0 represents the regular execution of the protocol by the attacker: through un-
stacking and stacking, she builds a term on the stack along a particular trace.
The transition (bluei; z/z′) enable her to mark a fork when building a test in
her frame with a particular stack symbol (tile) blue, enriched with information
about how and where it was put on the stack. This fork corresponds to the
resettr,φ operator defined sooner. By looping in q1, the attacker can continue
building the first term of an equality, following the usual execution of the pro-
tocol, if it were for the presence of the new tile blue which can only go down on
the stack for at most |uji | tiles. If this tile appears on top of the stack, meaning
the attacker builds a pulled-up test, she can try to go back to her mark to build
the second member of the test. If this second term manages to end up exactly
as the previous one, an equality is reached and the word is recognized by the
automata, witnessing the said equality.
Note that APFork has a fixed number of states, and a polynomial number of
transitions : transitions are added for each branch and suffix of any input term.
Thus, APFork is of size polynomial with respect to the size of P .
What remains now is to prove that P and Q satisfy conditions ForkP and
ForkQ if, and only if, L(APFork) = L(AQFork).
1. If L(APFork) 6= L(AQFork): from a word u in L(APFork) r L(AQFork) for
instance, build the corresponding minimal trace (tr, φ) in number of out-
puts, and a true and pulled-up test w1 = w2. This operation is done in the
same fashion as with automaton APConst, by using letters of u as channel
names for the couples of input and ouput. The test is indeed pulled-up as
a blue tile indicates the first time the top-level random seed of wψ appears
in the frame. The test is moreover true as activating the last transitions
(exit; red/) requires the stack to be identical to the stack before turning
the blue tile red. Several cases for u not belonging to AQFork can occur:
(a) a transition q0
ci;z/z
′
−−−−→ q0 or q0 bluei;z/z
′
−−−−−−→ q1 is not possible: there is
no frame ψ such that (tr, ψ) ∈ trace(Q), as these transitions mimick
the semantics of the protocol. Thus ForkQ fails.
(b) a transition q1
ci;u¯
j∗
i /u¯
′j∗
i−−−−−−−→ q1 is not possible. Either the previous
remark still applies and Q cannot execute a particular input; or a
blue tile cannot be unstacked, meaning that the corresponding test
will not be pulled-up in (tr, ψ). Indeed it corresponds to the case
where resettr,ψ(w1) < resettr,φ(w1). The index in the frame where the
blue tile was put, ie. the forking point, did not correspond to the
first occurence of the top-level random seed of w1ψ but to a latter
step. w1 = w2 is not pulled-up in (tr, ψ) and ForkQ is false.
(c) the blue tile is not at the top of the stack upon becoming red: the cor-
responding test will not be pulled-up in (tr, ψ) either. It corresponds
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to the case where resettr,ψ(w1) > resettr,φ(w1). The forking point did
not correspond to the first occurence of the top-level random seed of
w1ψ but to a previous step. Once again w1 = w2 is not pulled-up in
(tr, ψ) and ForkQ is false.
(d) the red tile is not at the top of the stack upon reading the last letter
of the word: the test is pulled-up but false in ψ. The stack at this
point, without the red tile, is not identical to the stack before the
blue tile turning red, making ForkQ fail.
Hence ForkQ fails as soon as u /∈ L(AQFork). Symmetrically, if u ∈
L(AQFork)r L(APFork), ForkP is false.
2. If P and Q do not satisfy conditions ForkP nor ForkQ. Suppose ForkQ
is false: there exists a trace (tr, φ) of P , w1,w2 ∈ dom(φ) such that w1 =
w2 is true and pulled-up in (tr, φ) but
• either there exists no frame ψ of Q such that (tr, ψ) ∈ trace(Q)
• or w1 = w2 is not pulled-up in (tr, ψ)
• or w1 = w2 is pulled-up in (tr, ψ) but w1ψ 6= w2ψ.
In the first case, from tr we can build a word u ∈ L(APFork) r L(AQFork):
indeed there exists w ∈ dom(φ) such that in(ci,w) for some channel ci
is possible in P but not in Q. From seqtr,φ(w) build a word u1 = u′1.a
in the same fashion as with APConst. Then let u = u′1.bluea.red.exit:
u ∈ L(APFork)rL(AQFork) as AQFork cannot evolve from state q0 as our se-
mantics are consistent with the transitions (ci; u¯
j
i/v¯
j
i ). Let us now consider
the two remaining cases:
(a) w1 = w2 is pulled-up in (tr, φ) but not in (tr, ψ): from seqtr,φ(w1) and
seqtr,φ(w2), as in the previous steps, build a word u which will be in
L(APFork) in the following way: if seqtr,φ(w) = s.s1 and seqtr,φ(w′) =
s.s′1 where s is the maximal common prefix of those two sequences, let
u0.cm = pi1(s), u1 = pi1(s1) and u′1 = pi1(s′1). Then u = u0.bluem.u1.red.u2.exit:
Then either resettr,φ(w1) < resettr,ψ(w1) in which case the transition
q1
red;(blue,i,j,m)/red.u¯′−−−−−−−−−−−−−→ q2 is not possible or resettr,φ(w1) > resettr,ψ(w1):
a transition q1
ci;u¯
j∗
i /u¯
′j∗
i−−−−−−−→ q1 or q2 ci;u¯
j
i/v¯
j
i−−−−−→ q2 will be impossible; the
two cases representing whether the top-level random seed in w1ψ is
introduced (strictly) before the forking occuring when stacking a blue
tile.
(b) w1 = w2 is pulled-up in (tr, φ) and in (tr, ψ) but wψ 6= w′ψ. Build
the word u from the sequences leading to w1 and w2 as usual, u will
be in L(APFork) but not in L(AQFork) as the transition q2
exit;red/−−−−−→ qf
is impossible because the tile red will not be at the top of the stack:
if it were, the final stack and the one before the transition from q1
to q2, minus the blue tile, would have been identical, thus witnessing
an equality between w1ψ and w2ψ.
We finally get the desired result:
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Theorem 3. Let P and Q in Cpp, we have that: P ≈fwd Q ⇐⇒ L(AP ) =
L(AQ).
Proof. We define AP with an enriched input alphabet such that
L(AP ) = a.L(APConst) ∪ b.L(APFork)
where a and b are two new symbols. Doing similarly with AQ, we get using
Lemmata 10 and 11 that P ≈fwd Q, if, and only, if L(AP ) = L(AQ).
D From language equivalence to trace equiva-
lence
This section is devoted to the proof of Proposition 2 introduced in Section 5.
Proposition 2. Let A and B be two real-time GPDA: L(A) ⊆ L(B)⇐⇒ PA v
PB.
Proof. Let A = (Q,Π,Γ, q0, ω,Qf , δ) be real-time GPDA. For the purpose of
this encoding, we consider that we have the following constants in Σ0:
• {q | q ∈ Q}, i.e. one constant for each state of the automaton;
• {α | α ∈ Γ}, i.e. one constant for each letter in the stack-alphabet;
• an additional constant kwell.
Words in Γ∗, i.e. stacks, will be represented through nested symmetric
encryption with private keys representing their counterparts in Γ. For the sake
of brevity, given a word u = α1 . . . αp of Γ∗, we denote by x.u:
• either the term senc(. . . senc(x, α1, y1) . . . , αp, yp) where y1 through yp are
variables used for nonces when x.u is used in as an input pattern;
• or the term senc(. . . senc(x, α1, n1) . . . , αp, np) where n1 through np are
actual names.
For every a ∈ Π, q ∈ Q, and k ∈ N, we define:
Uq,a = {u ∈ Γ∗ | (q, a, u) ∈ dom(δ)}
U sufq,a = {u ∈ Γ∗ | existsv ∈ Uq,a, u ≺ v}
U¯q,a = (ω.U
suf
q,a ∪ Γ.U sufq,a)r (Uq,a ∪ U sufq,a)
where ≺ denotes the strict suffix relation. Note that because dom(δ) is finite, as
the automaton is finitely described, the sets Uq,a and U¯q,a are also finite for any
a ∈ Π and q ∈ Q. Moreover, the automaton being deterministic, given q ∈ Q
and a ∈ Π, for every word u ∈ ω.Γ∗, either there exists a unique suffix u′ of u
such that u ∈ Uq,a or there exists a unique suffix u′ of u such that u′ ∈ U¯q,a,
and this disjunction is exclusive.
These sets can be interpreted as follows: Uq,a is the set of words on the
stack alphabet that can be unstacked upon reading a in state q. U¯q,a can be
seen as the set of shortest words which are not suffixes of any word of Uq,a, and,
thus the shortest words to unstack to be sure no transition from q reading a is
possible.
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Given the RGDPA A, we now define the protocol P in the following way:
PA := ! in(c0, start).new n.out(c0, senc(ω, q0, n)) (0)
| ! in(ca, senc(x.u, q, y)).new n˜.out(ca, senc(x.v, q′, n)) (1q,a,u)
| ! in(ca, senc(x.u′, q, y)).new n˜.out(ca, senc(x.v, kwell, n)) (2q,a,u′)
| ! in(ca, senc(x, kwell, y)).new n.out(ca, senc(x, kwell, n)) (3a,well)
| ! in(cf , senc(x, qf , y)).out(cf , start) (4qf )
where a quantifies over Π, q over Q, u over the words in Uq,a, u′ over U¯q,a
and qf over Qf . q′ is the first component of δ(q, a, u), whereas v is its second
component. As A is deterministic, PA happens to be in Cpp.
We define PB in a similar fashion with B. We need to prove now that
L(A) ⊆ L(B) if, and only if, PA v PB.
1. If L(A) 6⊆ L(B), then PA 6v PB: there exists a word w ∈ L(A)rL(B). We
will build a trace (tr, φ) of PA such that there exists no equivalent trace
(tr, φ′) of PB. To build (tr, φ), we will mimick the behaviour of A when
reading w: the first branches to use is (0), enabling the attacker to activate
other branches of the process. As w ∈ L(A) and A is deterministic, there
exists a unique sequence of transitions of the form δ(q, a, u) leading to
a accepting state qf ∈ Qf . For every such transition the attacker will
activate a branch (1q,a,u) in PA. If w = a1 . . . an, we define (tr, φ) as
follows:
tr = in(c0, start).out(c0,w1).in(ca1 ,w1).out(ca1 ,w2)
. . . in(can ,wn).out(can ,wn+1).in(cf ,wn+1).out(cf ,wn+2)
and φ is defined as expected given our semantics. Because of the definition
of Uq,a for any a and q, the inputs on the channels cai are possible, the stack
of the automaton upon reading ai and its current state being faithfully
represented by the term wiφ. Thus (tr, φ) is indeed a trace of PA. When
reaching qf , the attacker can use the branch (4qf ) to output the public
constant start. As w 6∈ L(B), the corresponding sequence of transitions in
B does not lead to any accepting state:
• either a transition δ(q, a, u) is not possible, in which case u /∈ Uq,a:
then there exists a suffix u′ of u such that u′ ∈ U¯q,a, enabling a tran-
sition (2q,a,u′) on channel ca for the attacker, and every subsequent
transition is of the form (3a′,well) for some channel ca′ ,
• or the state reached in B is not in Q′f or, as previously described, a
transition (2q,a,u′) has been taken: the sequence in(cf ,wn+1).out(cf ,wn+2)
cannot occur in PB.
Consequently, there exists no trace (tr, φ′) ∈ trace(P ′), thus PA 6v PB.
2. If PA 6v PB, then L(A) 6⊆ L(B). First note that, for every frame φ of
PA or PB, for every w ∈ dom(φ), wφ = start or wφ is an encryption
with a fresh nonce. In particular, if w,w′ ∈ dom(φ) and w 6= w′, then
wφ = w′φ = start or wφ 6= w′φ, meaning that no equality other than
one using constant start can appear in φ. Now consider the shortest trace
(tr, φ) of PA, in terms of number of transitions, such that there exists no
equivalent frame (tr, ψ) ∈ trace(PB). Because of the definitions of Uq,a
and U¯q,a, for any a ∈ Π, a transition of channel ca is always possible. Two
cases can a priori occur:
RR n° 8290
36 Chrétien, Cortier, & Delaune
• tr contains no input/output on channel cf . Then there exists a unique
frame ψ such that (tr, ψ) ∈ trace(PB). In such a case, we know that,
for every w ∈ dom(φ), wφ 6= start. Thus, as mentioned shortly before,
no equality whatsoever can hold true in φ or ψ. For this reason, φ
and ψ are statically equivalent, contradicting the non-equivalence of
(tr, φ) and (tr, ψ).
• or tr contains an input/output on channel cf . Let w ∈ dom(φ) be
the corresponding variable in the frame φ. If that output can be
matched in PB, then tr is not a minimal witness of non-inclusion as
start cannot be used to trigger any other branch. Hence PB has to
be unable to match the input on channel cf . Let s = seqtr,φ(w) and
u be the generalised projection of s on its first component. u is then
a sequence of channel names. Because tr was the shortest sequence
of transitions, u = c0.ca1 . . . can .cf . Let v = a1 . . . an: v is a word of
Π∗, and, in particular,
– v ∈ L(A): because transitions (1q,a,u) in PA faithfully represent
transitions δ(q, a, u) in A and a transition (4qf ) can only be fired
if qf ∈ Qf .
– v /∈ L(B): because no transition (4qf ) could be fired, either B
cannot read v or, after reading v, B is not in any state of Q′f .
Hence v ∈ L(A)r L(B), proving that L(A) 6⊆ L(B).
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